Exec Sandbox
Single exec tool running caller Python in a network-isolated locked-down sandbox.
What can you do with Exec Sandbox?
- A non-zero
exit_codeortimed_out=trueis a normal result, not a tool error. Only invalid - Sandbox v1: Python 3 with stdlib + PyYAML, Jinja2, Pillow, numpy, pandas, matplotlib.
Install
Add this to your client's MCP configuration (Claude Desktop: claude_desktop_config.json; Cursor: .cursor/mcp.json; VS Code and others use the same "mcpServers" shape).
docker.io/idconstruct/mcp-exec:v0.5.4claude mcp add exec-sandbox -e 'MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORT=stdio' -e 'MCP_EXEC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S=30' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_TIMEOUT_S=300' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES=1048576' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_STDIN_BYTES=1048576' -e 'MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN=<your mcp_exec_auth_token>' -- docker run -i --rm docker.io/idconstruct/mcp-exec:v0.5.4
{
"mcpServers": {
"exec-sandbox": {
"command": "docker",
"args": [
"run",
"-i",
"--rm",
"docker.io/idconstruct/mcp-exec:v0.5.4"
],
"env": {
"MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORT": "stdio",
"MCP_EXEC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S": "30",
"MCP_EXEC_MAX_TIMEOUT_S": "300",
"MCP_EXEC_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES": "1048576",
"MCP_EXEC_MAX_STDIN_BYTES": "1048576",
"MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN": "<your mcp_exec_auth_token>"
}
}
}
}
Environment variables
MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORTMCP transport. Must be 'stdio' for direct docker/stdio use.MCP_EXEC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SDefault wall-clock timeout per exec, seconds.MCP_EXEC_MAX_TIMEOUT_SMaximum wall-clock timeout a caller may request, seconds.MCP_EXEC_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTESCap on combined stdout/stderr before truncation.MCP_EXEC_MAX_STDIN_BYTESCap on stdin passed to the sandboxed code.MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKENsecret Optional X-MCP-AUTH token (http/sse transports only).
Documentation
From the project's README on GitHub, refreshed weekly. Links open on GitHub.
mcp-exec
English | Русский
Public OSS MCP server (Go, MIT) exposing a single powerful tool — exec — that runs
caller-supplied Python code in a network-isolated, locked-down sandbox and returns
stdout / stderr / exit_code. It is the "code-execution mode" building block: instead of
flooding an agent's context with hundreds of tool schemas, the agent writes code that orchestrates
the work.
Works over three transports — stdio / HTTP / SSE — with an identical tool set everywhere
(official modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk).
The exec tool
Input: { code: string (required), timeout_s?: int, stdin?: string }
Output: { stdout, stderr, exit_code, duration_ms, truncated, timed_out }
- A non-zero
exit_codeortimed_out=trueis a normal result, not a tool error. Only invalid input (emptycode, oversizedstdin) is a tool-call error. - Sandbox v1: Python 3 with stdlib + PyYAML, Jinja2, Pillow, numpy, pandas, matplotlib.
Security model (invariants)
Per execution: no network, non-root, cap-drop=ALL, no-new-privileges, read-only rootfs,
no CAP_SYS_ADMIN, ephemeral tmpdir (cleaned up), wall-clock timeout (kills the whole
process-group), memory/PID/CPU limits, capped output (1 MiB → truncated). Runs are serialized
within an instance; scale out with replicas. Caller data (code/stdin/output) is never persisted
and never logged in full — only metadata.
execis the most powerful surface there is. When embedding it in an agent, gate it behind that agent's tool-policy (trusted roles only).
Network note: --network none only applies to stdio. In HTTP/SSE the container needs
networking to serve its port, so sandboxed code would inherit egress — deny it at the orchestrator.
In k8s, a NetworkPolicy that allows ingress to the port and denies all egress:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata: { name: mcp-exec-lockdown }
spec:
podSelector: { matchLabels: { app: mcp-exec } }
policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]
ingress: [{ ports: [{ port: 8080 }] }]
egress: [] # deny all egress → sandbox has no network
Run
go build -o mcp-exec ./cmd/mcp-exec
MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORT=stdio ./mcp-exec
Docker (recommended production posture):
docker run --rm -i --network none --read-only --cap-drop ALL \
--security-opt no-new-privileges --user 65532:65532 \
--tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,size=64m \
--memory 256m --pids-limit 128 --cpus 1 \
idconstruct/mcp-exec
--tmpfs /tmp is required: the rootfs is read-only, and each run needs a writable
ephemeral workspace (cleaned up after).
Optional auth (HTTP/SSE)
Set MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN to require every HTTP/SSE request to carry a matching X-MCP-AUTH header
(constant-time compare; 401 otherwise). Empty token disables it. Not applicable to stdio.
Configuration
| Env var | Purpose | Default | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORT | stdio \ | http \ | sse | stdio |
MCP_EXEC_ADDR | listen address for http/sse | :8080 | ||
MCP_EXEC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S | default wall-clock timeout | 30 | ||
MCP_EXEC_MAX_TIMEOUT_S | timeout ceiling | 300 | ||
MCP_EXEC_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES | combined stdout+stderr cap | 1048576 | ||
MCP_EXEC_MAX_STDIN_BYTES | stdin size cap | 1048576 | ||
MCP_EXEC_PYTHON | interpreter path | python3 | ||
MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN | if set, http/sse require X-MCP-AUTH header (constant-time); empty = off | `` |
Not in v1
bash / multi-language, network from the sandbox, proxying other MCP servers into the sandbox.
License
MIT.
Frequently asked questions
What is Exec Sandbox?
Single exec tool running caller Python in a network-isolated locked-down sandbox.
How do I install Exec Sandbox?
It runs on your machine. In Claude Code: claude mcp add exec-sandbox -e 'MCP_EXEC_TRANSPORT=stdio' -e 'MCP_EXEC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S=30' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_TIMEOUT_S=300' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES=1048576' -e 'MCP_EXEC_MAX_STDIN_BYTES=1048576' -e 'MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN=<your mcp_exec_auth_token>' -- docker run -i --rm docker.io/idconstruct/mcp-exec:v0.5.4. For other clients, paste the JSON configuration from this page into their MCP settings.
Does Exec Sandbox need an API key?
Yes. It expects MCP_EXEC_AUTH_TOKEN, which you set in its configuration.
Is Exec Sandbox open source?
Yes. Its code is on GitHub under the MIT license.
Who maintains Exec Sandbox?
It is published by inhuman. AI.tn lists it but does not maintain or endorse it.
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